home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Shareware Overload Trio 2
/
Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO
/
dir33
/
cwru_ct.zip
/
91-10.ZS
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-11-06
|
4KB
|
75 lines
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SPECTRUM SPORTS, INC., et al. v. McQUILLAN
et vir, dba SORBOTURF ENTERPRISES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 91-10. Argued November 10, 1992-Decided January 25, 1993
Shortly after the manufacturer of sorbothane-a patented elastic
polymer with shock-absorbing characteristics-informed
respondents, distributors of medical, athletic, and equestrian
products made with sorbothane, that it would no longer sell them the
polymer, petitioner Spectrum Sports, Inc., became the national
distributor of sorbothane athletic products. Respondents' business
failed, and they filed suit in the District Court against petitioners
and others, seeking damages for alleged violations of, inter alia, 2 of
the Sherman Act, which makes it an offense for any person to
``monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States.'' A jury found that the defendants violated 2 by, in the
words of the verdict sheet, ``monopolizing, attempting to monopolize,
and/or conspiring to monopolize.'' The Court of Appeals affirmed,
noting that, although the jury had not specified which of the three
possible 2 violations had occurred, the verdict stood because the
evidence established a case of attempted monopolization. Relying on
its earlier rulings in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F. 2d 459, and
its progeny, the court held that the jury could have inferred two of
the elements of that offense-a specific intent to achieve monopoly
power and a dangerous probability of monopolization of a relevant
market-from evidence showing the defendants' unfair or predatory
conduct, without any proof of relevant market or the defendants'
market power, and that the jury was properly instructed that it could
make such inferences.
Held: Petitioners may not be liable for attempted monopolization under
2 absent proof of a dangerous probability that they would
monopolize a relevant market and specific intent to monopolize. The
conduct of a single firm, governed by 2, is unlawful ``only when it
threatens actual monopolization.'' Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 767. Consistent with this approach,
Courts of Appeals other than the court below have generally required
a plaintiff in an attempted monopolization case to prove that (1) the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with
(2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power. Unfair or predatory conduct may be
sufficient to prove the necessary intent to monopolize. However,
intent alone is insufficient to establish the dangerous probability of
success, Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 402, which
requires inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and
the defendant's economic power in that market. There is little if any
support in the statute or case law for Lessig's contrary interpretation
of 2. Moreover, Lessig and its progeny are inconsistent with the
Sherman Act's purpose of protecting the public from the failure of the
market. The law directs itself only against conduct that unfairly
tends to destroy competition, and, thus, courts have been careful to
avoid constructions of 2 which might chill competition rather than
foster it. The concern that 2 might be applied so as to further
anticompetitive ends is plainly not met by inquiring only whether the
defendant has engaged in ``unfair'' or ``predatory'' tactics. Since the
jury's instructions and the Court of Appeals' affirmance both
misconstrued 2, and since the jury's verdict did not negate the
possibility that it rested on the attempt to monopolize ground alone,
the case is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 7-12.
907 F. 2d 154, reversed and remanded.
White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.